The surprisingly normal streets of Tehran

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Introduction to FP Live

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0:44So one of the paradoxes of the war in Iran is that it's been dominating the headlines. We have all this high-level analysis of the ongoing diplomacy, on the psychological makeup of the leaders, and yet we have very little reporting on what ordinary life is like in Iran. There are good reasons for this. It is hard for Western journalists to get access and visas. When they do, safety is a real concern. And the internet has been shut down since January,

1:14so communications are difficult. But if you scratch beneath the surface, you can find accounts from within the country. So I thought it would be useful to speak to someone who's actually been inside Iran during the war. I turned to Ali Hashim. He's a reporter at Al Jazeera, the Qatari media giant, and he spent six weeks in Tehran during the ongoing war. He was also there just after the mass protests in January and last year during the 12-day war. Ali lived in Iran for

1:46three years in the 2010s, when he was working for the BBC and for some other regional media. So he has a real sense of perspective and history with this country. I have to say, Ali's reporting surprised me. By his account, life in Tehran actually feels quite normal. Shops are open, restaurants are open, people are going to work. The internet, as we know it, is shut down. But there's a local intranet that has its own version of Uber and Amazon and WhatsApp. And so people are

2:22using that to continue a version of their regular lives. Most of all, he says the war has led to a rally around the flag effect. Whatever anger people have with their government, they're putting it to one side for now, as they deal with an external threat. You might disagree with some of what Ali portrays in this interview. But I think it's worth hearing his account and letting him describe what he sees in Tehran. Ali was in Doha when he recorded this. I'm skipping my usual take this week. Instead,

2:55I will direct you to our previous episode where I answer your questions in an AMA. It was invigorating, and we talked about Iran, Russia, China, the global economy, and much else. If you haven't listened yet, try it out. But for now, let's hear from Ali Hashem. Ali, welcome to FP Live. Thank you, Ravi.

Life in Tehran

3:18So, Ali, you spent six weeks in Tehran while the war was going on. You're out now. Talk a little bit about what that was like. What were you seeing around you. What I saw during the 50 days of my stay in Iran was an attempt by people, state, and the whole society to normalize the situation. I arrived in Tehran 10 days after the war. But in that time, many people left and returned back to

3:51the capital. It was clear also where are the neighborhoods that are being hit on daily basis. So, many people took their precautions, measures, or at least during the day, went to their neighborhoods and in the night slept in other places. So, if I'm to describe life in Tehran during those days, it was close to normal. You can see some restaurants open, some shops open, some malls partially open.

4:25That gives you an indication that the system and also the people were taking into consideration this could be a long war. Let me just clarify something here. I've been there also before the war and there was a different feeling in the street. Explain that. In February, I went just days after the end of the protests. And you know, these protests, thousands of people were killed. Now, before the war, the mood in the street was completely different. And we heard a lot from people. And

5:01actually, we were even concerned the amount of boldness some people had. And they didn't go on camera with that, but they were talking clearly, openly that it was clear that there was a very deep rift between sectors of the society and the system in Iran. And that rift was reflected, actually, in the protests. Now, when we left and came back for the war, something different was there.

5:31And even some people who were anti-establishment, anti-regime, anti-government were expressing in a different way their point of views. At least what I've heard is that this is a war and we need right now to concentrate on war, on how to defend our country. What you're suggesting, it seems to be what analysts have said would be a rally around the flag effect. Were Iran to be attacked by an

6:03external power, then, you know, instead of protesting against their own government, Iranians would rally around the flag. And that's kind of what you saw? Absolutely. This is part of what we saw. I cannot generalize, but I can say at least from what I saw, many people decided that it's time to stand by their country, regardless of their point of view towards the system. So they would say that whenever there is no war, we can protest the system. But when

6:33there is a war, when there are bombs falling on the country, when there are enemies standing on the borders, then we have to be with our country. And I think this is not strange for any country. I mean, it's not something that is exceptional when it comes to nation states, such as Iran. Iran isn't a new state. It's not a result of the Sykes-Picot agreement. I mean, in the Arab world, you know, you had new states that were a result of the post-Ottoman empire. This is a very old state. And the way

7:08people will deal with their national identity is different. The way they will deal with enemies is different. And one of the very strange effects I saw during this war, and actually, I've been covering wars for the past 20 years, even more than that, in each and every war from Lebanon to Russia to Somalia, Gaza, Libya, wherever. I've never seen people under bombs in the squares with their children, women, children, men. Now, this phenomena wasn't just happening one day, another day, then there's

7:46nothing. Every day, and even if you're passing in the squares at 4 o'clock in the morning, 3 o'clock in the morning, you'll see them. And that was the first striking picture I saw when I got in Tehran. But explain that to me. Why would you take your children to the square when you know that that square could be under attack? That does not make sense to me. Well, this is how they were reflecting on it, that we need to be here to show that we are together, we are in solidarity with our nation. This is our duty to do, and we are going to do it. As I was

8:22telling you, this is unprecedented for me. I did not see this in other countries. On a daily basis, in main squares. Now, what I wrote for FP in this regard, this is not just related to the war. This is also related in a way or another to showing the strength of the system. So it's not completely voluntary, and it's not completely managed. So it's between both. The system is allowing those people

8:53to come there, providing all the infrastructure for their rallies. And at the same time, these people want to be there. The more there are attacks on the country, the more there is a feeling of threats, existential threat, especially, for example, when President Trump during the war spoke about the geography of Iran, that he cannot guarantee it's going to be the same. This had a very huge impact on people, and many people went to the streets to express

9:25their reaction. Also, when there were attacks on civilians, when there were, for example, the day President Trump said he is going to wipe the civilization. These were big days in major squares in Iran, and not only in Tehran, in several cities. People will pour there, and they will show this feeling or this mood of resilience and defiance at the same time. I was going to ask you, what do Iranians think about Donald Trump?

9:56Well, Iranians, we have many Iranians, 93 million Iranians. But in general, the way Donald Trump is dealing with Iran is a bit provocative to normal Iranians, because, you know, those people, they're proud. Regardless, they're with the system, against the system, even when they are challenging their own very government or regime or establishment, they're very proud. So the moment they see someone talking with them this way, they feel intimidated and at the same time very provoked. And this adds to

10:31the feeling of defiance and resilience. We're always asking as journalists what the Islamic Republic wants, or we never ask what Iran wants. And actually, Iran is like the building, while the Islamic Republic is like a tenant inside this building, or the Pahlavi dynasty is a tenant inside this building. So this building has its own very rooted mechanisms of defiance and resilience and resistance towards any kind of provocation. And this is just provoking the spirit of the Iranian. These stances or these threats, or even

11:10just statements, the way he speaks, we destroyed them. We killed them all. Everything is gone. Nothing is left. Especially for people who live there and see that, yes, there was a war. There are many buildings destroyed, but the country is there. The system was there. They feel the system on daily basis. I mean, I'm not saying about the government, I'm not saying this. There is a system in this country that's been going on for centuries, and it's not going to change. As you're describing how the people, to some degree, felt this sense of loyalty and a need to stand up for

11:46their country, if not just the regime as it is. Let me take a question from Ahu Azur. And Azur asks, has the government felt the value of its citizens in this support? In other words, given what you're saying, will the government change how it acts, having seen the way its own citizens are reacting to a massive, serious crisis? Well, this is, I think, the same question that was asked in 2025, because also people rallied around

12:25the flag. The only different element is that there's a supreme leader that was killed during this war. I think there is a new, let me say, administration leading the country. So we'll have to wait and see if they are going to derive conclusions out of this moment. Because, you know, the backbone of any system is its people. If you're not going to preserve your people, it's not going to be repeated the next time that is a war. Can I just push back a little bit, Ali? Because, I mean, what you're saying makes complete sense, but

13:00this is not a normal government. And especially for those of us in the West who, you know, don't get to go inside Iran the way you do. What we hear, of course, is this is a government that is brutal, that is incredibly repressive, that cracked down on protests earlier this year and killed many thousands of people, that has done so before, that will do so again. So it's not as if this is a government that purely has the interests of its people at heart. It is also primarily focused on its own survival, as it has for the better part of five decades. So just to push back a little bit on

13:35what you're saying, it's not as clean as that. This is a definitive moment for both the government in Iran. Because, you know, you have the government, you have the system, and you have Iran as a country. So the system and the government, this is a definitive moment. If they are not going to build on what happened in the past few weeks, and come out with a new, let me say, social and political contract with people, then probably this is one of the last few chances for the Islamic Republic. Because they've taken a

14:12lot of chances in the past. And I think that things have been changing in the country. The way we see the social freedoms in the past few, let me say, months, they've been changing. Or even years after the Massa Amini protests, we've seen more easing on social freedom. These were the protests about the headscarf. Yeah. But, you know, problems in Iran are not actually limited to the headscarf issue. The headscarf was a symbol for several other problems that were under this umbrella, including the gap between the

14:49system and the youth, including the gap of narrative, the identity gap, plus the economic issues and the political issues. I think when it comes to the political representation and economic hardships and the sanctions, at least from my own point of view, this comes second to the gap between the system and the people, the system and the youth. Because if these gaps are not bridged, then even if there are reforms when it comes to political representation, even if the economy is better, but still that gap

15:26is there. And there is, let me say, a sector in this society that lives in a bubble and is not interested even in participating. That was the situation in Iran before Massa Amini protests and after the Massa Amini protests. There was a bubble where many youth lived in it, and they didn't really care what's going on between the politicians. But I struggle to understand this a little bit because, again, I mean, my reading of Iran, for example, there's this massive water crisis that has been brewing for

15:58decades now, but really has been coming to a head in the last year or two. It's just very hard for regular Iranians to get drinking water, regular water supplies. And then you add to that the economic pressures that they are no doubt facing, and that will continue to get worse the longer the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz continues. You know, at some point, don't the people then turn around and say, well, our government is bringing this on us?

16:27Well, as far as the war continues, I don't think that this is happening, at least for now, because the feeling is that there is existential threat to the nation. It's not about the government, it's not about the country, it's about the nation. But the moment things will change, if there are no solutions, then probably we'll see a street once again open. And I think this is one of the main issues why currently the Islamic Republic wants a comprehensive deal. It doesn't want to

17:00end this with a ceasefire. It doesn't want to end this just, you know, getting back to the status quo before the war. Because the status quo before the war will mean deeper economic problems. It will mean more and more reasons for people to rise. And take into consideration, during this war, this is what the government said, Mrs. Mohajirani, the spokesperson of the government, said that $270 billion of losses in infrastructure were recorded because of Israeli American airstrikes. So $270 billion, add them to

17:37all the other losses, add them to the sanctions, that will create a real problem. But at the same time, as far as the war continues, people are restrained from taking such a step, because this and that could not mix. A protest against the system at the time of war could have an effect even on how people see themselves.

18:06And we'll be back in a minute with more of Foreign Policy Live. Remember, you can catch these conversations live and on video on foreignpolicy.com. Subscribers get to send us questions in advance, in addition to a range of other benefits, including our magazine. Sign up.

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Internet Shutdown

19:02I want to ask you about the internet, because it's been shut down now for many months. And many countries do this, by the way. They shut down the internet to prevent people from finding ways to organize, to launch protests, demonstrations, to share information, to get imagery and video out into the wider world. This is common in governments around the world. But in Iran, the internet shutdown was seen as particularly draconian because it was complete

19:33and national, not just localized. But when you and I were speaking before this, you mentioned that, in fact, Iranians can communicate and that they use some version of an internal intranet of sorts, a gated internet that allows them to shop and hail cabs and get deliveries. Talk a little bit about what that's like. Well, you know, the internet, the international internet, because now this is how they explain it. International internet is shut down. That was blocked during the protests in Iran.

20:07The internal internet is on. So they can't use, for example, Google. They can't go to the foreign policy's website. But there are things that are domestic and local that they can access. I mean, it's selective in a way. Sometimes Google opens. Sometimes you have access to Gmail. Okay. There are also something called the white SIMs. So we journalists, most of us will get the white SIMs, whereas we are allowed to get into internet. And it's not only about journalists, even other

20:38sectors. So for example, if someone works in programming, in digital marketing, some people are being given these SIMs because their businesses require that they have connection to international internet. However, for normal people, there is another layer, which is the local internet. So on my Iranian phone, for example, I have several applications for communication. Applications such as Rubika, Ballet, these are like WhatsApp and Telegram. They just give you the chance to

21:13communicate with people inside the country as if you have WhatsApp. But this is an Iranian version of WhatsApp. Rubika has its own Netflix there. You can watch films on it. Also, this layer of internet allows you to use delivery applications such as Digikala for taxis, Snap, Tapsi, you know, all these Iranian locally developed applications that allow you to shop, to use taxis, to go around, to get delivery. So you can use them on that layer of internal internet. In a way, this also has its

21:49own economic reason. Because the Iranian economy partially depends on internet. There are many sectors within the Iranian economy that depend on e-commerce. So this is also going to be blocked. Then there is going to be a real storm coming. For example, taxis, the Iranian Uber, people actually have this as one of the main sources of life, because they drive their cars, they get people around,

22:22and they get paid through these applications. If these people are being suffocated economically, also, this will add another layer of pressure on them, and will create many reasons for protests. And they do not need that, especially at such a time.

Economic Pain

22:42And hence, this domestic version of the internet. I'm curious, how bad is the daily economic pain because of the war? I mean, I mentioned water earlier. Clearly, there are some commodities that are more expensive. Inflation is rampant. Talk a little bit about how an average citizen living in Tehran is coping. And also, how long can they sustain whatever it is, whatever amount of damage they're facing, how long can they hold out? Well, it's really a very difficult question because this needs

23:20a lot of knowledge on the ground. At least during the days of war, I think the exchange rates were were stopped, were frozen. So that dollar wouldn't change its price till, I think, a couple of weeks ago when it opened. And then the dollar just surged from 160 to 180,000. I think right now it's like 200,000. Yeah, there's a lot of pressure, economic pressure, especially with people who have already lost their jobs. With respect to the government, the government is still paying subsidies in this

23:52regard. I think they're trying this way to contain the crisis. But this is going to be really difficult. It's not easy. And I think that's part of the war. The economic war is another layer in this war. And it's mainly meant to bring the war into the streets of Tehran this way. Let me take another subscriber question. This one is from Jim Clancy, a former CNN reporter who's reported from the region extensively. And he wants to know if there was another round of US and Israeli

24:25airstrikes that would actually result in leadership change. So actual regime change, not just a personnel change, but some form of regime change. How do you imagine the Iranian people would react to that? Is that something they want? Well, it's not about what they want. Because what happened on the 28th of February, the killing of the Supreme Leader at his compound with his military advisors, with his

24:55family, his wife wasn't killed by his granddaughter and other members of the family. That was a moment that President Trump thought that he was able to remove the regime. And later on, what happened is that another version of Khamenei came, which is his son. And rather than a Khamenei that was restrained, deterred, actually, by the United States, you had a Khamenei, a Mushtaba Khamenei that seemed to be confrontational and adopted a madman strategy in the region. So rather than accepting an end of the war

25:30at that time, at the beginning of the war and just building on President Trump's threats, he wanted to fight and he fought with the whole region. So the problem is that those attacks, the killing of leaders, are not changing the system because the system isn't built around one leader. The system is a multi-layered organization. I mean, compartmental, let me say, machine that works in parallel. You have the

26:03military, you have the national security, you have all kinds of institutions that are working together and the killing of the leader is not changing the system. So even trying to collapse the system from within is facing a lot of challenges because it's too complicated to collapse it. And actually, for now, there are no real alternatives. Who are the alternatives? I mean, you might have, for example, Mr. Pahlavi, the former crown prince. He is one of the names that are circulating as a possible substitute to the current system in

26:42Iran. But what's his infrastructure in Iran? How can he take over in Iran? How is he going to overcome the power of the military in Iran, the power of the system in Iran, the institution? Because it's not easy. You're talking about hundreds of thousands of ideological fighters. I mean, the IRGC or the military, for example. So these are ideological. And their ideology, it's not just like in the past, for example, in the USSR, you had a communist party. And that was an ideology built on an idea by people. Karl Marx

27:19and Lenin, for example, came out with an idea and they adopted this idea. They believed in this idea. So the problem is that with the Revolutionary Guards, they adopt a religious idea, an idea that is connected not just to the system and not just to the ideology that the system is preaching, or mobilizing them around. But also they are believing in a religious idea that is related to the hidden imam. This is not something easy to collapse. It's not easy because these people believe that they are

27:58preparing the world for the hidden imam to reappear. So they are going to die for him. And this is what we've been seeing. Those people who are fighting till the moment, who are launching missiles or used to be before the ceasefire. Sometimes a hundred soldiers will be killed just to launch a barrage of missiles. Why? Because he believes or they believe that they are going to be martyrs. This is ideological war.

28:29It's not easy to face it with any kind of threat. Let me bring this back to the regular people again. We've come to associate the awful phrases, death to Israel, death to America, as slogans that go alongside Iranian demonstrations. But we've also often heard that those chants are not representative of public opinion. Do you think this war has in any way changed how Iranian citizens feel about the United States or Israel?

28:59In Urabi, for 47 years, the Islamic Republic has been preaching, mobilizing enmity and hostility towards the United States and Israel. And frankly, talking, that kind of enmity and hostility couldn't be really seen except within the ideological sectors of people, of the community. But now, I have the feeling that this is the first time that this ideological crust that was covering this

29:30feeling is gone. And maybe this is the first time that Iranians are experiencing, or at least some sectors of the Iranian community are experiencing enmity and hostility organically because they've been killed because of, for example, the attack on the school in Minab, because of several attacks in Tehran and other Iranian cities, because of the attacks on the infrastructure, because of the threats to obitrate the whole country's wealth and resources. So this time it's different. This time it's

30:04not a cleric preaching enmity and hostility. This time people are experiencing firsthand this feeling towards the United States and Israel. Wow. We'll have to leave it there, Ali Hashem. Thank you so much. Thank you very much for the opportunity.

30:23And that was Ali Hashem, a senior correspondent for Al Jazeera, who has been in and out of Iran on reporting trips several times in the last decade. Lots more coming up on FP Live. Next week, is Putin the primary winner of the war in Iran? What does the situation in the Middle East mean? For the war between Russia and Ukraine? We will speak with the Russian expert, Alexander Gabuev. FP Live, the podcast is produced by Rosie Julin. The executive producer of the show is Dana Schoen.

30:56And I'm Ravi Abrual. I'll see you next time. I'll see you next time.