How to Change the World

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0:30Our handle on YouTube is at Hidden Brain, or just click the link in the show notes for today's episode. Again, that's youtube.com slash at Hidden Brain. Okay, here's today's show.

0:46This is Hidden Brain. I'm Shankar Vedantam. To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace. Those are the words of the first U.S. President, George Washington, in his inaugural State of the Union Address. George Washington knew a thing or two about war. Over four decades of military service, he took part in a number of bloody battles. Among them was the Battle of Trenton, in which American colonists battled German soldiers paid to fight for the British.

1:23The battle was depicted in the 2000 film The Crossing. In scene after scene, the Americans thrust their bayonets into the Germans. They kill others with cannon and musket fire. Their enemies repeatedly try to regroup, but are forced to flee. Finally, the Germans, realizing they cannot win, kneel in surrender.

1:51These scenes, like many depictions of war, can be hard to watch. But they also force us to face uncomfortable questions. Doesn't Washington's war, and countless others like it, prove that the realists are right? That violence is the most effective means to change. That power does flow from the barrel of a gun.

2:17This week on Hidden Brain, the surprising truth about what actually produces radical change, and the profound implications for individuals and nations. Support for Hidden Brain comes from Lily. On this show, it's fascinating to discuss the unseen forces shaping the human brain. Consider conditions like Alzheimer's disease, where changes in the brain may develop up to 20 years before noticing symptoms.

2:48Talk to your doctor to understand your potential risk factors for dementia due to Alzheimer's disease, and ask for a cognitive assessment. Visit brainhealthmatters.com for more information and resources.

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3:38Support for Hidden Brain comes from Lowe's. Lowe's Memorial Day event makes summer cookouts easier for less. Save $80 on a Charbroil Performance Series 4-Burner Grill, now just $199, and keep the food coming. Get up to 45% off select major appliances to keep everything running smoothly. The best lineup is here at Lowe's. Valid through May 27th, while supplies last. Selection varies by location. See Associate or Lowe's.com for details. Many of us watch movies depicting war, or TV shows where detectives save the day by bursting in on the bad guys, guns blazing.

4:20These sorts of stories are based on an assumption. Using force might be unpleasant. It might even be immoral. But it's highly effective, the surest way to get what you want. At Harvard University, political scientist Erica Chenoweth studies whether this common assumption is true when it comes to mass movements for change. Erica Chenoweth, welcome to Hidden Brain. Thank you so much, Shankar. Erica, I want to look at your own journey into this area of research.

4:51When you were a kid, your mom bought you a book called Zlata's Diary. You were enthralled by this book. What was it about? Basically, this is the story written by Zlata Filippowicz about what it was like living as a child under siege during the siege of Sarajevo. As a 13-year-old kid, I couldn't help but be moved by the experiences of being a kid that were not going to be available to her, her friends, and others because of the war.

5:22I mean, in many ways, it's like the fascination that many people have had over the years with, you know, the diary of Anne Frank. It gives you a window into what it's like to go through the experience of war. Later on, I understand you became really interested in the history of World War I. You'd go to the public library with your family, and you loved a book about World War I Medal of Honor winners. What was the appeal of the book? Well, I think I was always really fascinated with World War I. I can't actually remember the origins of the fascination, to be honest, but from the time I can remember, I was looking at military history books.

5:58And one that really caught my eye was the one about Medal of Honor winners, in part because it described these situations of heroism and courage, but also these situations of just horrific wartime conditions, trench warfare and the types of experiences that people had just serving in the war on and off the battlefield. As an undergrad, I understand you took a military science class. So it sounds like you were developing a real interest here in military history.

6:29Yes, I was interested in potentially serving in the Army after graduating from college, and they had an ROTC program, which I didn't eventually enroll in, but I did take the military science course to find out whether it was a path for me.

6:51The September 11th terrorist attacks took place during Erica's senior year in college. They prompted Erica to go to graduate school to better understand the nature of terrorism. And there was a really influential article and later book published by a scholar named Robert Pape, who's at the University of Chicago. And he basically argued that suicide terrorism was on the increase because it was a remarkably effective technique. And, you know, there was a debate about this. And another really important article and set of arguments was emerging from a fellow named Max Abrams.

7:27And he was arguing that actually looking beyond just suicide terrorism, if you look at terrorist events and you look at sort of campaigns of terrorism or terrorist groups, and you look at how many of those groups have actually achieved what they said they wanted, it's a remarkably low number. And so he was saying that terrorism was not effective. And then there was this other political scientist saying that suicide terrorism in particular is very effective. So there was sort of a vibrant debate happening in the field. And my research was really on the question of why it is that people use terrorism in democracies,

8:02specifically where there are so many other methods of political expression that are available. So that's sort of where I was in the mid-2000s as well.

8:13Would it be fair to say that your broad belief at this point was that power indeed does flow from the barrel of a gun, from your interest in military history and your knowledge of wars past and present? Yeah, I think that's right. And I think I would qualify it somewhat just by saying that it flows from the barrel of many guns. So, you know, and I think there are a lot of people that would make a similar assumption, that when violence failed, it was more a question of capacity, that rebel groups or terrorist groups were using violence but didn't have really the capacity to back up their political might.

8:49I just want to stop for a second to note that the intuition that you had is I feel like an intuition that many people have in the culture, right? When we think about, you know, how, what succeeds in terms of bringing about change, whether that's change on an individual level or a group level or a political level, we see lots of examples. We see movies and books which are all about the use of violence and war that basically achieve people's ends. And in some ways it feels like that intuition sort of flows through our lives in a way that's often not questioned.

9:20I think that's true. I mean, I think from a very early time in life, at least in the United States, many children are encountering, you know, war stories. And whether that's about the founding of the country, whether it's about the Civil War, the Vietnam War, we encounter these fairly early on. And they're sort of memorialized and mythologized in ways. And to me, I guess I grew up with a sense that war was awful but necessary sometimes or inevitable because of the nature of humanity.

9:55And yeah, I think you're right that as a political culture, there's little questioning of the utility of violence. So in June 2006, you were, I believe, working on your dissertation and you were attending an academic workshop. But some of what you heard at this workshop made you skeptical. What was the workshop and what were people saying? It was a workshop that was put on by the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, which is an educational foundation based in D.C.

10:27The thing that was really surprising about it was that the content was all totally new to me. And, you know, the basic claim, I would say, running through all of the content was that nonviolent resistance, when unarmed civilians use protests, boycotts, strikes, stay aways, other forms of non-cooperation, that they can actually engage in collective action in a way that's as effective or even more effective than when they use armed insurgency.

10:59And the first thing that occurred to me is that when people would refer to particular cases like the People Power Movement in the Philippines or the Solidarity Movement in Poland or the Anti-Pinochet Movement in Chile, you know, my immediate response was, those are very interesting cases. I hadn't really thought about them in terms of, you know, nonviolent collective action winning compared to armed insurrection. But for any example that someone brought up, I could think of a counterexample

11:30of where an armed revolution had succeeded. Erika immediately also thought about nonviolent protest movements that had failed, like the peaceful pro-democracy protests at Tiananmen Square in China in 1989. As the world watches and listens in horror, the peaceful pro-democracy demonstration in China comes to a violent and bloody end, crushed by waves of Chinese military forces. Hundreds of unarmed civilians, hungry for freedom, mowed down in Beijing by gun-firing soldiers.

12:03And Tiananmen Square was not the only example of a failed, nonviolent uprising that occurred to Erika. Well, you know, there's certainly plenty of examples more recently. The one that springs to mind immediately is the Syrian revolution. But, you know, that's another example of where, you know, you have a sustained mobilization that is up against a regime that effectively decided that it could roll the dice and use extreme brutality and suppress the movement effectively.

12:37And, of course, you know, even a cursory glance at history suggests numerous examples where violent insurrection succeeded. I mean, and starting with, you know, the American Revolution or the French Revolution. Yes, absolutely. I mean, start with the Haitian Revolution and the American Revolution, the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, the Algerian Revolution, the Chinese Revolution. So we have many different examples that leap immediately to mind. You know, most people, I think, wouldn't necessarily imagine that there's really anything

13:09about nonviolent resistance that could make it even compete with that.

13:17As Erika marshalled example after example of violent revolutions that were effective on nonviolent movements that had failed, another political scientist at the conference, Maria Steffen, threw down a challenge. Examples showing violent and nonviolent movements succeeding or failing were just that. Examples. They were anecdotes. They weren't data. Now, it's never possible to rerun historical events. You couldn't ask the question, would the French Revolution have succeeded if it had been nonviolent?

13:50You couldn't rewind the clock of history, run the revolution differently, and see if the outcome might have turned out another way. But Maria asked Erika if there was still a way to scientifically test which approach was more effective. Basically, my answer to Maria was how I would do it is I would collect data for a very long time period. I would use every country in the world as the universe of potential cases. And then I would look for comparable cases featuring primarily nonviolent resistance and violent resistance.

14:28And by comparable cases, I mean cases that were seeking similar goals. And I would apply a hard standard to that and look only at cases that were seeking radical revolutionary goals. Not looking at, say, civil rights campaigns or different types of reform campaigns, but look at campaigns that were trying to overthrow the incumbent national government or campaigns that were trying to push for independence, either by expelling a foreign military occupation or colonial power or through secession.

14:59Because those are the types of goals that most people associate in their minds with armed revolution. And then let's apply a very strict definition of success, which is that the campaign had to have achieved its outcome within a year of the peak of its mobilization. And it had to have had a decisive impact on the outcome and achieved what it said it wanted. So in the case of independence campaigns, they can't just achieve autonomy. It has to be de jure and de facto independence. And the reason to set it up that way is because if you were a skeptic like me,

15:34you would want to compare the hard cases and you'd want to be able to come up with some kind of measure of the relative effectiveness given those very strict criteria.

15:48Erica was proposing an incredibly high bar to test the effectiveness of nonviolent movements. Maria Steffen's response? Let's do it. Let's find all the cases of insurrections and revolutions over more than a century where groups of people sought to overthrow a regime. Let's classify them as violent or nonviolent, based on how the campaigns were predominantly carried out, and see which ones succeeded. By comparing lots and lots of cases, the researchers could finally say something objective

16:20about the relative effectiveness of the two strategies.

16:24Erica said okay, but was quite sure what they would find. All the childhood books, all the military history Erica had absorbed, pointed in the same direction. Nonviolent movements might be high-minded, but violent movements would be more effective. When we come back, what the political scientists found. You're listening to Hidden Brain. I'm Shankar Vedanta.

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18:02This is Hidden Brain. I'm Shankar Vedanta.

18:06Erika Chenoweth grew up fascinated by stories of war and military heroism. Like many people, Erika recoiled at the horrors of war, but came to believe that violence was an effective way to accomplish one's goals. Popular culture endorsed this idea. Movies, books, and TV regularly tell us that if you really want to get your way on something, force is probably the most effective strategy. In 2006, Erika met another political scientist, Maria Steffen, who threw down a challenge.

18:40If violence was really more effective than nonviolence in enacting change, the historical data should prove it. If you compare the history of violent insurrections with nonviolent campaigns for change, you should find that the people who used guns were far more successful than the people who didn't use weapons.

19:02Erika and Maria began to analyze hundreds of cases of conflict and rebellion starting in the year 1900. Erika, I want to start by looking at some of the cases you and Maria examined. And let's start with this one. In October 2000, hundreds of thousands of protesters gathered in the city of Belgrade. There were massive demonstrations calling for government reform. One evening in October, a large crowd gathered in front of the city's parliament building. They chanted, he's finished, he's finished.

19:33Who were they talking about? Well, they were talking about Slobodan Milosevic. One of his nicknames is the Butcher of the Balkans, who had stolen an election that had taken place in the previous weeks. And the movement that organized in advance of the election had expected Milosevic to lie about the results of the election and had set up these parallel vote tabulation and very well-organized kind of verification processes to demonstrate the fraud.

20:07So the Serbian organization was called Otpor, and Otpor really became famous for using humor and theatrics in their anti-Milosevic protests. One such campaign was called A Dinar for Change. Activists painted Milosevic's face on a barrel and placed it in front of the Belgrade National Theater. People who passed by could pay a small amount of money to then hit the painting with a bat. It was like a game you play at a county fair. I want to play you a clip of one of the leaders, Sergei Popovich,

20:40explaining the strategy in a TED Talk. We put the big petrol barrel with a, you know, portrait picture of Mr. President on it. In the middle of the mainstream, there was a hole on the top. So you could literally come, put the coin in, get the baseball bat, and hit his face. Sounds loud. We were sitting in a nearby cafe having coffee, and there was a clue of people waiting to do this lovely thing. Well, that's just the beginning of the show. The real show starts when the police appears.

21:12What they will do? Arrest the shoppers with kids? Doesn't make sense. Of course, you could bet. They've done the most stupid thing. They arrested the barrel. And now the picture of the smashed face on the barrel with the policeman drugging them to the police car, that was the best day for the photographers from newspapers that they ever will have. What was the effect of this campaign, Erika? There's no doubt that Otpor had a really important impact on opening people's minds to imagining a new future.

21:42One of the long-term legacies of that campaign was the different types of tactical innovations that were experimented with there. In particular, the type of method that Sergei was just describing is called a dilemma action. And a dilemma action is something that Otpor really perfected. The dilemma is, what do you do, right? So do you just leave it and ignore it? Then you have all of these people smashing Milosevic's face.

22:12Or do you arrest somebody, anybody who's there, create a scene? It would look illegitimate. Or do you put the barrel in the police car? And then, you know, it's sort of this humiliating and absurd political theater. But it's a technique that is now used in a much more widespread way, I would think, because the logic of it is clearer to people. And the other thing, of course, is the humor. And humor is really important as a way to really poke at the invincibility

22:43kind of myth or narrative that exists among many different autocrats or autocratic movements. And so if there's one thing that we know that autocrats don't like, it's people laughing at them.

23:01One of my favorite vignettes comes from Morocco, where there is an independence movement in Western Sahara. And it's illegal to fly the colors of the flag of the independence movement. And there was a group of protesters who wanted to mobilize a flag, an illegal flag flying protest. And they announced in advance that this would be taking place so that the authorities would show up. But instead of themselves showing up to fly the flag,

23:32they basically rounded up a bunch of stray cats and tied the flags onto their tails and then release them into a crowded area where then the riot police were like chasing them up and down narrow alleys and stuff. And this is a real dilemma action because it creates this like ludicrous scene of absurd political theater. But, you know, they also couldn't arrest anybody. Literally herding cats, huh? Exactly. Literally herding cats,

24:04but not able to really figure out who the real protest organizers were.

24:11So the Serbian police began to crack down on Odpur. They were arresting the protesters, many of whom were teenagers. And they were also calling the protesters terrorists. But increasingly, it wasn't just young people who were involved. Older people were getting increasingly drawn into the struggle. Why was that? Well, I think that the movement likely did a very good job of appealing to a wider and wider base of supporters. There was a period in which they were experiencing

24:43a pretty high degree of police repression. And I was told by one activist there that they began organizing something called grandparents protests, which is when they would ask their retired grandparents to come and march or demonstrate with them. And at those marches, they noticed the police were much less likely to start swinging their batons at the crowd. There was just a taboo against beating the elderly in public. And they exploited that taboo. And, by the way,

25:13also increased their numbers and the diversity of their campaign. What was the final outcome of the protest? Did it work? It did. Milosevic announced that he was retiring to spend more time with his grandson. He fled. He fled the square. And the movement effectively walked through the line of policemen who obviously were not going to fire on them anymore and occupied the parliament building. And inside, apparently, they found lots of ballots

25:46that were pre-marked for Milosevic, so further demonstrating the fraud. Let's fast forward 20 years and turn from Eastern Europe to Africa. The country of Sudan was ruled for nearly 30 years by President Omar al-Bashir, who was a brutal dictator. He presided over the genocide in the Darfur region of southern Sudan in the early 2000s. Now, there were periodic uprisings over the years, but the security forces quickly suppressed them. But then in December 2018, protests erupted across the country

26:17after the government raised fuel and food prices.

26:24The demonstrations were organized by a group called the Sudanese Professionals Association. What were the techniques they used? One of the most important techniques that the SPA was able to organize en masse was a general strike and various other limited strikes and stay-aways. And stay-aways can be really important for movements that are facing brutal regimes because, unlike mass demonstrations, they don't necessarily place people

26:54in positions of directly confronting the agents of repression. But in this case, there were also mass demonstrations, sit-ins, marches, protests. They used a really wide range of nonviolent methods in the course of that campaign. So soon after these protests really became widespread, al-Bashir was actually removed in a coup, and the Sudanese military established a military council.

27:25But the SPA kept protesting. They wanted the coup leaders to hand over power to the people and establish a democracy. And this led to something that's now known as the Khartoum Massacre. What happened, Erika? Yeah, so what was happening there is that there was a massive sit-in outside of the military headquarters demanding that the civilians be represented in the new government and that a transition to democracy take place as soon as possible. And various security forces committed a mass atrocity.

27:57They killed and sexually assaulted and tortured over 100 people, some of whose bodies they dumped in the Nile River. And in the aftermath of that event, the SPA wisely, I think, called for a general strike and mass non-cooperation. And the reason I say it was incredibly wise and strategic is, again, it didn't necessarily put people in direct contact with those militias and security forces

28:28by calling for a massive four million strong demonstration, but instead say nobody's going to work until we have the opportunity to be at the table negotiating a peaceful transition to democracy. And it was a remarkably effective maneuver because not only did it help to keep people involved and engaged, but it also disrupted the day-to-day order of things

29:00so that the transitional junta didn't feel like it had a way out other than to work with some of the civilian representatives to negotiate an outcome.

29:16One of the other lessons that I'm getting from this is that even highly repressive regimes at some level depend on the cooperation of the people being repressed in order to hold on to power. And when that cooperation is withheld or withdrawn, it becomes actually quite difficult for even very authoritarian regimes to hold on to power. That's right. I think that's the basic theory. The ruler does depend on so many people to stay in power.

29:47Like, they're not doing it themselves. And when very large numbers of people refuse to continue supporting them, things collapse rather quickly. Movements have to do it. Maria Steffen has argued, which is extend the nonviolent battlefield into constituencies upon whose cooperation the regime does depend. So that's one kind of tricky factor that explains some variation, I think, in the outcomes of nonviolent movements. So we've talked about

30:21a couple of movements that successfully utilized nonviolent techniques to enact change. I want to look at an example of a largely nonviolent movement that sometimes dabbled in violence. And it's instructive to see what happened. In May 2011, there was a wave of protests in Spain calling for socioeconomic reform. These were largely peaceful. The movement called itself 15M. It was named up to May 15th, which is when these demonstrations began. People began occupying central squares in the main cities of Spain.

30:53And a large percentage of the public, about 65%, supported 15M. Can you tell me what happened in the course of these protests that caused some of them to turn violent and the effects of this turn on public opinion? Basically, there was an episode in which some of the protesters were provoked into using violence in one way or the other. And there were a couple of social scientists who had been conducting surveys on opinions

31:23toward the movement before that event took place. And then they were able to do surveys after that event took place as well. And what they found is that the average support for the movement dropped by about 12% in the aftermath of that event. And the findings were qualified somewhat in the sense that among people who already were very supportive of the movement, there wasn't a very large drop in support.

31:53But among people who were kind of adjacent to the movement politically, who were sympathetic to the movement before, or who were kind of not affiliated with the movement in any way, there was a much bigger decline in support. So in other words, the episode of violence tended to have very little effect on base solidarity, but it had a pretty big effect on alienating potential third-party supporters of the movement that would have allowed it to expand its base.

32:25And so I think the key takeaway of that study is that these types of incidents can be really risky for movements that are trying to expand their base of supporters. And expanding the base of supporters is one of the key things that nonviolent resistance campaigns need to do to win. They need to grow in number and in the diversity of their supporters and in the links that their supporters have to different pillars of support. Yeah, so this was worked by the political scientists Jordi Munoz

32:55and Eva Anduiza. They happened to be in the area at the time studying 15M, so they were able to survey the public both before and after the turn to violence. But I want to stay with this idea for a moment because I suppose if your base is large enough, if the number of people whom you have on your side is a significant majority, then possibly turning to violence perhaps does not affect the outcome very much because you already have a significant majority on your side. But if you're in a position where you are 20% of the population,

33:27you really need to recruit a significant number of people to come over to your side in order to make up a majority. And it seems to be in those cases where turning to violence runs the risk of alienating people who might otherwise support you. Yes, that's exactly how I would read kind of the state of the literature on this one, which is that it's a much more risky political move to do when a movement is very small and trying to expand its base than it is if a movement is already very large,

33:57enjoys a lot of popular support and critically, the opponent is hated by lots and lots of people. So if it's just a regime that's made so many missteps and has shattered its own legitimacy to such a large extent that, you know, basically 90% of the population, one where the other wants change, you know, it may be less politically risky. But there still are a lot of risks. One of them is just the expansion of repression. It's much more likely

34:27to be really intense and to expand indiscriminately when movements do begin to mix nonviolent and violent methods. And that's in part why so many regimes seem to try to deliberately provoke nonviolent movements into kind of breaking down their discipline because they know that it helps bolster their own legitimacy, their own calls for the need for law and order and the restoration

34:58of stability. And they know that significant portions of the population will largely agree with that. And so, you know, this is part of the reason, you know, why Augent's provocateurs or incidents of repression meant to provoke people out of their discipline are such a ubiquitous part of the autocratic toolkit. It's interesting that I think in these conflicts you actually have in some ways a test of discipline on both sides because the protesters,

35:29nonviolent protesters, are often also trying in some ways to incite the government authorities into overreacting, into cracking down, into repression because I think they also recognize that repression reduces government support. It reduces the legitimacy of government authority just as the governments might realize that when, you know, protest movements resort to violence, it tends to undermine their legitimacy and also undermine their mass appeal. Yes, I think that's a fair comparison.

35:59I also think that they're playing a similar game in the sense that they're both trying to divide and rule the other. So the logic of nonviolent resistance is to grow the base in order to create these defections from the opponent's support base. So basically, you know, the movement is effectively trying to divide the opponent and dislocate it from its pillars of support. And that, you know, the regime is trying to do the same to the movement. So we've looked at a few examples

36:29of cases where people used violence or nonviolence or a combination of these tactics to try and enact change. And obviously, the specifics of each conflict are unique and cataloging conflicts as violent or nonviolent probably involves some judgment. Things may not be entirely, you know, black and white. But when you step back and look at the big picture of examples of both violent and nonviolent protest movements over the span of the 20th century, what did you and Maria find? Well, the basic descriptive statistic

37:01that really jumped out is that the nonviolent campaigns were twice as likely to have succeeded as their violent counterparts and that the rates of success for nonviolent campaigns had actually increased over the latter half of the 20th century and into the beginning of the 21st. So, in other words, nonviolent resistance was working much more than skeptics like myself would have expected. At the same time, that doesn't mean that it worked all the time. We found basically

37:31that about around half of the cases that we studied had succeeded and about 25% of the cases of armed resistance had succeeded. And so, you know, we also would never argue that violent resistance never works because clearly one out of four cases had succeeded as well. So, nevertheless, I at least was very surprised by the fact of this and it definitely motivated us to continue trying to figure out why. When we come back,

38:08the subtle psychological mechanisms that explain why nonviolent movements might seem less likely to succeed than violent campaigns but end up being more effective in the long term. You're listening to Hidden Brain. I'm Shankar Vedantam. Support for Hidden Brain comes from Cash App. What if getting started with Bitcoin didn't have to feel

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40:09I'm Shankar Vedantham. At Harvard University, political scientist Erica Chenoweth studies the effectiveness of political protest. Along with Maria Steffen, Erica has studied more than 100 years of struggles for radical change around the world. These included both violent and nonviolent revolutions and insurrections. They found that nonviolent campaigns were twice as likely to succeed as violent campaigns. Violent forms of protest might get a lot of press and attention, but they tend to invite harsh

40:40repression from authorities and also to turn off potential allies. Erica and Maria have discovered four key factors that explain why nonviolent movements appear to be increasingly more effective than violent insurrections. The first factor is mass participation. So movements that win tend to be much larger and more diverse than movements that don't. And nonviolent campaigns tend to be able to elicit much larger and more diverse participation than armed campaigns.

41:10The second factor is the ability of the campaigns to divide and rule the opponent by shifting the loyalties of people within various pillars of support. So the larger the base becomes for a movement, the more likely it is that participants in the movement will have direct ties to people in the opponent's pillars of support like economic and business elites, important politicians, civil servants, state media,

41:42different types of police or security forces or other authorities, local government and local authorities. And, you know, the more those connections begin to be embedded within the movement, the more likely it is that the movement can maneuver in ways that begin to really shred the loyalties, you know, of people in those pillars of support. The third factor is the ability of movements to tactically innovate, especially moving away from mass demonstrations, rallies, and protests

42:12and more into forms of non-cooperation like strikes, stay at homes and kind of undermining power for the opponent. And that's really the main thing is that these movements aren't out there to like melt the heart of the dictator, you know. They're out there to remove the bases of the dictator's support. So that's a really key distinction and I think is probably what leads a lot of people to think that non-violent resistance campaigns are naive is that they think

42:43they're trying to like change the mind of a brutal dictator