Is Cuba Trump's next real estate project?

State Department report on Cuba

0:00Hey, everyone. You're listening to Code Switch from NPR. I'm B.A. Parker. And I'm Jean Demby. So, Jean. Yes, Parker. I want to tell you about this U.S. State Department report issued this summer. It's 100 pages titled, Cuba, the Capital of 21st Century Communism. Okay. Okay. So, the report lays out this whole theory of how Cuba has been influencing the U.S.

0:31from Fidel Castro meeting with Malcolm X in 1960s Harlem to the George Floyd protest to what the State Department calls the rise of Antifa. It's all because of Cuba. All because of Cuba? So, in the eyes of the State Department, Cuba is like this master puppeteer. Listen. Now, let me read you a quote. The report says, To mistake Cuba's poverty for harmlessness is to misunderstand the threat entirely.

1:03Its material weakness was never the measure of its danger. Its power was always ideological, subversive, and parasitic. End quote. Okay. I just want to reiterate. This is present-day Cuba they're talking about. A country that the U.S. has been sanctioning for more than a half century that's been in crisis, very notably in crisis, all year. That Cuba? Yes. I mean, we are multiple generations out from Cuba being a formidable adversary.

1:36And yet, this year, the Trump administration declared a national emergency over Cuba and blocked almost all access to their fuel imports. And that, as we know, has resulted in power outages of more than 20 hours a day,

Day-to-day life in Havana

1:52depending on where you are on the island, right? Right. And so, one of our producers, Xavier Lopez, reached out to a writer and historian in Havana right now named Alexander Hall. Now, Alexander's internet is unreliable. Understandably. Yeah. So, he sent us messages over WhatsApp. So, you'll hear Xavier reading translations of what Alexander told him. Alexander said that day-to-day life in Cuba right now is a struggle for survival.

2:25Problems with transportation. Power outages lasting more than 20 hours. Alexander is Afro-Cuban. He's a critic of the Cuban government and of U.S. sanctions policy. This has also generated problems in the access to stable and dignified drinking water. A lack of gas for cooking and difficulties with Social Security

2:57have given rise to violence and crime as a result of the deepening crisis. He also told us people's reactions to the blackouts vary a lot. Independencia de la clase, del estatus y de la posición social de cada persona, de cada familia. It depends on each person's class, status, and social position. Each individual, each family. And what Alexander is saying, that is not the story that the State Department's 100-page report is telling us.

3:31Yeah. So, the U.S. considers Cuba a threat. That's what we're getting into today. How that posture is affecting the day-to-day living of people on the island. When Xavier reached out to Alexander Hall to ask about the conditions in Cuba right now, this is what he said. I'm of the view that every day of life in Cuba is a struggle for survival.

4:05And beyond the mantras and the worn-out political speeches, I believe that living in Cuba each day is an act of resistance. Regarding people's discontent, I think it shows up in many ways. From a protest outside the party's municipal headquarters, to a spontaneous neighborhood demonstration organized in a particular working-class area, to posts on social media.

Historical context with Michael Bustamante

4:33I wanted to get more context on the U.S.'s role in the current conditions in Cuba. So I called up Michael Bustamante. I'm an associate professor of history and the chair for Cuban studies at the University of Miami. In other words, I'm my university's Cuba guy. We talked to Michael earlier this year because Cubans have been deported from the U.S. in record numbers. I asked him how he sees the current popular uprisings in Cuba in historical context. I think the sort of pushback that we've seen, the sort of rolling, at times, nightly protests,

5:09you know, banging pots, things like that. To me, that does speak volumes. I mean, it is a clear expression of civic discontent, and it's quite a departure from what had been the norm in Cuban society. I mean, I still sometimes read news articles on Cuba that might report on a protest that happens or kind of a spontaneous demonstration and will say, you know, protest is incredibly rare in Cuban society. I don't think that applies anymore. I mean, that maybe once was the case, but it's sort of endemic, right? But that doesn't mean that that can be translated to a unified political movement.

5:42I mean, we're talking about sort of neighborhood-level expressions of grievance, and sometimes it can be almost instrumental that people conclude, not without reason, that if we make enough of a ruckus, we can get the government to somehow turn on our block circuit for an hour because they don't want to deal with the controversy, or they don't want this moment to go viral. So the government's sort of playing whack-a-mole. There are clearly people at the local level who are, you know, leading these efforts in some way, but that doesn't mean that there's some national-level kind of political movement that has any kind of capacity to really challenge the government.

6:15And part of that is also, I think, an ingrained lesson that folks have learned, sadly, from my point of view, from 2021. When there were nationwide mass protests in the depth of the pandemic at that point, the power situation wasn't nearly as bad. And what was, you know, powerful about that moment was that the protests were spontaneous, and that was also their Achilles heel, right? Because there wasn't a cast of leaders who could, you know, mobilize people to try to repeat it. And a lot of people got thrown in jail. So that lesson of deterrence, you know, in a sense was learned.

6:45But it is interesting how people continue to sort of challenge the state and the state of affairs as they see it in local ways and the ways that I'm describing. I mean, I am curious, when we're talking about, like, the impact of this energy and food crisis, does it differ along class and racial lines? Absolutely. How so? I mean, if you're going to try to put a solar panel on your home, you know, that costs you a few thousand bucks, right?

7:17Depending, give or take, right? And that's not money that every Cuban has laying around. There are some that work, say, in the Cuban private sector that might have that money. But in most cases, people that are able to come up with those solutions, they're often receiving support from families on the outside of Cuba who are sending the money and sometimes the goods themselves. The thing is that the history of migration from Cuba to the United States and the rest of the world is long tracked with sort of class and racial differences that are deeply embedded in Cuban society.

7:49And so it tends to be the case that people of African descent in Cuba have less access to remittances and family networks outside the country than those who are not. And so the sort of the follow-on effects from that, I think, are pretty clear in terms of the ability with which people can get by. Alexandra Hall told us something similar. Obviously, the Afro-descendent population in Cuba, which is a victim of structural racism,

8:21doesn't have the same economic conditions to face this crisis. National census themselves have shown that Afro-descendent people have worse living conditions. They live in poorer housing, receive less income from remittances, travel abroad less, generate less income. Most people are forced to resign themselves. They're deprived of the most basic things, and obviously they're victims of the daily struggle to survive,

8:53avoiding, well, stocking up too much in the fridge because the food can spoil, and then having to endure the blackout with all the consequences that implies. From long, exhausting hours of heat to the inability to keep anything refrigerated, even something simple as drinking cold water. Cualquier cosa, incluso siquiera, de tomar agua fría.

Impact of sanctions and energy crisis

9:13How does this current blockade differ from some of the ways that the United States has made life in Cuba previously harder? I mean, the United States has had a comprehensive sanctions program in place on Cuba since 1961-62. And, you know, there's been ups and downs or moments when it's been relaxed relatively or intensified relatively. But, you know, the outright cutting off of energy supplies is without precedent, simply put.

9:47I mean, U.S. sanctions have had all kinds of effects on the Cuban economy, on the Cuban people. I would also argue that over time they've also disincentivized the kind of reform that many of us on the outside would like to see. I think they tend to send Cuban officials into sort of a kind of almost like a modality of trench warfare, right? They reinforce a sort of a nationalist reaction. But, again, you know, you basically declare, as the United States has since January of 2026, that not only have we sort of taken off the board the country that was your main supplier of oil, Venezuela,

10:22but we're also telling other countries not to send oil to you or else we're going to impose tariffs. And even though the Supreme Court took away the tariff threat, countries haven't been willing to sort of buck the United States on this because I guess they conclude they have bigger fish to fry. So that's a really key difference. And the United States at this point has only let one shipment of oil in from Russia, but that was back in the spring. And so at this point, the energy grid is subsisting on the relatively small amount of oil that Cuba itself produces and, you know, alternative energy such as they're able to roll it out.

10:56So that's one key difference. And then the other key difference that I would point to is the administration issued an executive order on May 1st, which took sanctions in a new direction. And in a way, it was as if the United States was applying sort of sanctions tools that it's pioneered in other contexts and kind of bringing them to the Cuban case. And so these were sanctions that are secondary sanctions, meaning most U.S. sanctions to this point are really about blocking U.S. entities' ability to engage, trade, travel, etc.

11:32With Cuba, they've had third country effects in a variety of ways I can describe. But, you know, ostensibly a company from Mexico or Canada or whatever was not blocked by U.S. sanctions from trading with Cuba. As of May 1st, the United States has said that if you're a foreign company and you're doing business with Cuba and the Cuban government, in particular in a series of sectors that are strategic for the Cuban government, tourism, energy, mining, you risk getting basically blacklisted from access to the U.S. financial system.

12:03And so for multinational companies from Europe, like some of the hotel companies that had a presence in Cuba, that risk is not something that they can afford because they have global operations. And so we've seen a wave of foreign companies that had a presence in Cuba pull out. And that's really compounded things to a degree that's new. And it's also kind of cleared the deck for the potential of United States actors maybe grabbing up those opportunities that are being left behind. So there's something about this that feels a little bit like a shakedown. At the same time, the Cubans on the street, most that I know, also want their government to change in pretty profound ways.

12:40I mean, in that regard, how much of the crisis is due to the U.S. blockade and how much is it the Cuban government's on this management? This is the perennial question. And it's no, no, it's it's it's a great question. And I think it's the one that any serious Cuba analysts should be wrestling with all the time. And I don't think it's an easy one. And I don't think it's an either or. Right. I think it's both. And I think in in many ways, these things work together.

13:10Right. You could make an argument that.

13:14Cuban government mismanagement over the years and sort of clinging to a very outmoded state centered model of economic management. has made it harder to assemble a coalition in the United States to lobby effectively against U.S. sanctions. Right now, for example, in the midst of this crisis, and I think in some ways provoked by it, the Cuban government has rolled out a series of economic reforms that, at least on paper, look like the biggest liberalization of the Cuban economy, you know, since the revolution. Big questions about implementation and follow through.

13:45But there's really not a world that I see in which these economic reforms can really have any kind of takeoff or much impact in this kind of external sanctions environment. Right. So it's it's both things at once. Absolutely. And there's a there absolutely is a real power differential there between the United States and Cuba. But I think the Cuban government has also at times missed opportunities to maybe position themselves for a better relationship with the United States. It's not not because they should take steps because the United States says they should, but because I think the Cuban people deserve it.

14:18I mean, President Trump has floated the idea like a, quote unquote, friendly takeover. Yeah. What like what would that actually look like if it happens? I don't know. I mean, you know, far be it for me to try to get into the president's mind. You know, what we do know about the president is that the Trump organization in the 90s, I think it was, sent people down to Cuba to sort of sniff around and for future commercial opportunities at a time when they weren't supposed to be doing that. But I think probably for certain people in the administration, they see Cuba as a giant real estate opportunity, which it will be, you know,

14:53hard to know exactly what that looks like. But I'll give you one example. One of the international companies that pulled out of Cuba recently or said it was going to because of the secondary sanctions threat is a Canadian company called Sherat, which was a Cuban state partner in nickel mining in Cuba. It's one of the, I guess, few sort of mineral resources that Cuba has in some abundance. And it's a strategic resource. It goes into batteries and chips and all kinds of stuff. So Sherat says they're pulling out because they can't afford to lose their access to the U.S. financial system.

15:23And then they announce, wait a second, maybe we're not because we have not one but two potential buyers from the United States. And, oh, one of them seems to be someone who has some links to Trump world and might become a majority shareholder. And so then you start to put together a picture of, well, the sanctions have sort of pushed out U.S. competitors and have maybe set the table for if the Cuban government wanted to just let in American capital in certain sectors, maybe they could cut a deal with the United States to do so. The problem with that is that that runs head into Marco Rubio, the secretary of state,

15:55for whom Cuba is not just a commercial opportunity, at least in principle. It's also a sort of a deeper political commitment. And so how do you sell a soft takeover, which by which I think we can generally mean an economic opening, a sort of opportunities for American capital and business, but not necessarily the kind of broad political change that certainly many Cuban Americans are advocating for. I have a hard time understanding how the White House can sell that to Miami and South Florida. Maybe they don't care. But but that's that's where the math hasn't really added up to for me.

16:29It hasn't added up so far, at least in the last, you know, eight, nine months. How would you describe the U.S. goal in this? Like, why why are we doing this now?

16:41I don't think it's clear. I mean, on paper, we want freedom and democracy and open markets for Cuba. But again, we've had we've gotten very mixed messages from the administration in the last eight, nine months from, you know, Cuba's next and Cuba's going to be ours. And sort of this very possessive kind of rhetoric. Right. To at one point, the secretary of state saying, well, listen, we're all adults in the room and we understand that change in Cuba won't happen overnight. And perhaps, you know, we can we can work together.

17:11Right. But, you know, the administration does see the Western Hemisphere as its backyard and is trying to project that power that is clear. I think the frustrating thing for me is that this is also at a time when the Cuban people, many Cuban people have very legitimate reasons to want change. Yeah. And so this has led people to, I think, see in U.S. action, maybe some kind of an out to an objectively very difficult situation, but not always think, you know, 10 steps ahead as to what something like U.S. military action might mean. Right. I mean, one of the interesting dynamics in Miami recently is on the heels of the secretary of state sort of pushing off expectations for big action in the short term.

17:50You've got people in Miami saying, well, wait a second, like you guys created these expectations that Cuba was next. Cuba was around the corner. What are you chickening out? Like, go ahead and do it. Right. It's an interesting conversation where you hear people who want U.S. military action because they think that'll bring quicker resolution to all kinds of problems in Cuban society, but are willing to admit that the sanctions are making things worse. And just this pressure of an economic coercion campaign absence, some kind of force majeure from outside is not bound to bring about the result that they want either.

18:24And so, you know, that changes the political calculus in the Cuban American community, I think, is an open question, because just the sort of the purgatory of the pressure campaign indefinitely doesn't seem to be getting people to where they want, whether that's a mass uprising that then creates a pretext to the United States to intervene or, you know, succeeds in toppling the government itself. It's a real rock in the hard place situation where looking at the administration as a possible solution, but then that brings about new problems.

18:55Absolutely. Not to mention looking to an administration as a kind of a hallmark of democratic emergence or transition when it's an administration that has certainly challenged democratic norms in our own country, to put it to put it mildly. Right. So there's a lot of I can't necessarily blame someone in Cuba who is desperate for change and sort of thinking, well, I'm going to cling to where, you know, allies wherever I can get them. But there's a real risk that that Cuban person could also be used in pursuit of ends that are not necessarily his or her own. Right. And I think ultimately I want a Cuban in which that's more open politically, more open economically, which doesn't mean either that the state can't have a role.

19:31Right. But one that's also defined on Cuban's own terms, not from the outside. And let's remember, there's a long history of this. You know, the shadows of Trump talking in the way that he is about Cuba are so concerning to me as a historian and a Cuban American, because I know sort of the long legacy of Cubans fighting for independence and sovereignty and control over their economic destiny and having to contend with things like U.S. military occupation and the rest of it in the past. And so I'm not suggesting that I think the U.S. is about to occupy the island for four years like we did in 1898.

20:01But when you hear the administration talk in these terms about a soft takeover or a hard takeover or whatever, right, it calls back that kind of historical precedent. And for me, that remains concerning, even as I have great sympathy for people on the island who want to see their government change. Do you see the current situation in Cuba impacting the midterms here in the U.S.? I mean, only if something very surprising happens. I mean, there was a lot of chatter in recent months as to, you know, whether the United States was trying rhetorically to tee up Cuba for potential military action and Cuba's next and, you know, all of that kind of rhetoric without ever, I think, articulating a very clear plan of where that would lead.

20:45At this point, I think we're so close to the midterms that it seems like a real risk to escalate. The White House not only has the problem of Iran on its hands, right, which is a quagmire. It not only has the, I think, responsibility to help in as well as respond to the devastating earthquake that happened, to sort of go into a third environment, right, and try to do some sort of, you know, exterior intervention or political change seems like a real risky bet. I mean, if they can call it a quick win, you know, maybe it helps Republicans at the polls in places like South Florida, but I don't think it necessarily helps them on the map, you know, elsewhere that doesn't pay so much attention to a place like Cuba.

21:24So the signs that we've been getting from the administration and that nothing like that is coming soon, in recent weeks, the Secretary of State has seemed to be kind of deferring expectations of big change to the end of the administration. My read is that we were kind of stuck in this stalemate, but, you know, it's the Cuban people that are stuck in the middle and are suffering the effects. And I think a question is, if nothing happens before the midterms, then what? Is then the United States going to have more freedom of action to do what they want? Does that depend on how the midterms turn out for Democrats and Republicans?

21:56Might the White House not care, right? I think there's a lot of variables here that we just don't know how they're all going to fall at this point. I would just end by saying, I think that it's very easy and it's been concerning to just kind of hear how callous, you know, people in sort of the political debate are talking about, and often non-Cuban, right? You know, Cuba's next and we'll go in and sort of the AI image is circulating about, you know, a glorious future for Cuba without thinking about, I mean, put it this way.

22:27The notion that Cuba would be an easy win compared to Iran may be compared to Iran, but, you know, the task of economic reconstruction alone in Cuba at this point is just monumental. And that predates the crisis of the last five, six years, right? This is a society with very, very deep challenges and problems that's going to require, you know, the goodwill of the United States in the future, the goodwill of the Cuban people. It's not something that, you know, you can just score political points with. And I have a real concern that people are thinking about this sort of with a very short-term lens rather than thinking about what it's really going to take to get Cuban society on a better footing.

23:05Michael Bustamante, thank you so much for talking to me. Thanks for having me.

Solidarity with the Cuban people

23:14I want to bring it back to Alexander Hall in Havana. He had a message for people in the United States who want to show solidarity with Cubans. Supporting the Cuban people doesn't necessarily mean supporting a government. Supporting a government, a party, and a political system that is often cruel to its dissidents, often cruel to critical artists, and far too violent towards citizens who dare protest and demonstrate against the extreme hardships that they are forced to endure.

23:46So yes, I would like to say to those people, to the United States, that they should look for alternative tools to connect with ordinary people, to be more empathetic with the people at the bottom, and to strengthen solidarity in the midst of the harsh, difficult, and complicated situation most Cubans are living through. We reached out to the State Department for comment, but did not hear back.

24:32And that is our show. You can follow us on Instagram at NPR Codeswitch. All one word. This episode was produced by Xavier Lopez and Jess Kong. Thank you to Xavier for translating. And it was edited by Courtney Stein. And we'd be remiss if we did not shout out the rest of the Codeswitch Massive. That's Christina Calla and Leah Dinella, and Dahlia Mortada and Kayla Latimore, and Barton Girdwood and Yolanda Sanguini, and Jasmine Romero and Maya Dangerfield. As for me, I'm Jean Demby.

25:03I'm B.A. Parker. Be easy, y'all. Stay safe.